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ABSTRACT 
When immigrants need to save a large lump sum to purchase of home or for entrepreneurial efforts, many turn a “susu” or 
“partner” to build assets and secure middle-class status rather than mainstream financial services.  This financial practice of 
pooling savings and credit based on an individual’s social connections is known as rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs).  In these underground organized associations; participants agree to make regular contributions to an unregulated 
fund that participants then distribute, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation.  Policymakers view ROSCAs as an 
informal or alternative financial service operating under the radar of regulations, even though one-third of the adult U.S. 
population are users (FDIC, 2014; OIG, USPS, 2014).   Policymakers and the financial industry categorize consumers using 
informal or alternative financial services such as ROSCAs as “underbanked or unbanked” rather than “fully-banked.”   This 
policy position reinforces the established poverty pathology around poor people and saving, while casting ROSCA users 
negatively. In contrast, ROSCA users view themselves as “fully-banked” by mixing and matching informal, alternative, and 
mainstream financial services; view the informal and alternatives sectors more formal and positive than acknowledged; and 
achieve greater success saving and accumulating wealth with ROSCAs  
 
Keywords 
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alternative financial services, asset building, informal financial practice, informal kin savings networks, financial inclusion 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Missing from the asset-building and financial services literature is Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) 
(Ardener, 1994), an informal financial practice of pooled savings and credit based on an individual’s social connections. 
Predominately research on ROSCAs focuses on their origin and continued existence in many areas of the developing world; 
while little reference exists in the financial services literature related to ROSCAs as a substitute banking and savings tool.  There 
is minimal U.S. recognition of the hidden use of pooled savings, even though it is estimated that 6% of Americans over the age 
of sixteen use an alternative or informal method of savings (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012), and almost one-third of the adult 
U.S. population use some form of informal or alternative financial services FDIC, 2014; OIG, USPS, 2014).   
 
In response, this research explores how workplace-based ROSCAs are similar and different from traditional ROSCAs; how 
participants interact with other components of the consumer financial services industry; and whether participants use ROSCAs 
to build assets. If new and established groups consciously choose to save using ROSCAs connected to their immigrant group or 
their workplace; even with clear disadvantages; found would be evidence that familiarity, trust, social connections and peer 
pressure are important saving motivators and factors that influence their financial services choices that receive little public policy 
support and acknowledgement.   
  
The seminal work of Bonnett (1981) argues that “these associations are used by immigrants as a generational adaptive mechanism 
to cope with the urban complexities of New York …and their use is important among first-generation immigrants but less so 
among the second generation.” Unlike Bonnett who researched the organizers and participants of various kin and community-
based ROSCAs in Brooklyn; this work explores workplace-based ROSCAs organizers and participants; and explores deeper 
Bonnett’s belief that, “there is an overlap in the use between rotating credit associations and the larger banking and credit 
systems.”  In so doing, this research builds on the work of Bonnett who explored the overlap from both the view of workplace-
based ROSCA participants and how they are viewed and defined by the banking and financial services policy makers. 
 
Workplace-based ROSCAs are a departure from the more traditional immigrant community and kinship-based models.  There 
are two differences between the work-based ROSCA model the immigrant community and kinship-based model.  First, the 
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common denominator in the workplace-based model is the place of employment rather than an ethnicity, church, or community 
kin network.  Second, it is most common that the payments of the “throw” or “hand” are made in work-based ROSCAs on the 
payday of the workplace; possibly creating less financial risk than in immigrant community and kinship-based ROSCA models.  
The appearance of lower financial risk may lead some to participate in the workplace-based model who may not tolerate the 
higher financial risk of immigrant and community-based models.  This difference may motivate a different and possibly a larger 
pool of participants to engage in the workplace-based model.   
 
This research focuses on the overlooked and misunderstood existence and connections between participants’ use of three types 
of financial services to save and secure needed credit:  formal “mainstream” (regulated savings and commercial banks); 
alternative “fringe” (check cashing, pawn brokers and loan sharks); and informal ROSCAs and lending circles,).  Since policy 
makers and the financial industry categorize  ROSCA participants’ saving patterns using rigid definitions of “formal, informal 
or alternative” and their banking patterns as either “fully-banked (consumers using only formal “main street” regulated financial 
services), underbanked (consumers using a mixture of formal,  alternative and informal financial services), or unbanked 
(consumers using only alternative and/or informal financial services)” using an outside established view, overlooked is an 
alternative reality that  the informal and alternative sectors are more formal than acknowledged and viewed more positively  than 
expected.  Also missed may be a new pathology that ROSCA participants view themselves as “fully banked” even though they 
use alternative and/or informal financial services, while policy makers view ROSCA participants as underbanked because they 
use alternative and/or financial services in addition to formal financial services.   
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review presents what we know about U.S. ROSCAs and other informal saving models.   It highlights that the 
lion’s share of research focused on the international context and reveals a dearth on U.S. ROSCAs. 
 
Limited Research on U.S. use of Alternative Informal Savings Models – ROSCA 
Asset-building policy strategies have focused on finding solutions within the formal financial sector, with little consideration of 
policy solutions that may exist within the informal financial sector.  Even though literature details the existence of varied forms 
of informal financial cooperative coined “ROSCA” that places emphasis on its function to mobilize saving, such pooled savings 
tools are mostly omitted from U.S. asset-building discussions.  The research that exists on the extensive tradition of using 
ROSCAs in developing countries acknowledges that they are an essential aspect of how people work together to financially 
strengthen both their communities and themselves.  Conversely, a dearth exists on their use in the U.S and participants’ historical 
comfort and familiarity with pooled savings groups and kin networks.   
  
Recent research on informal finance continues to mostly focus on examining different aspects of ROSCAs operations in 
developing countries.  This literature includes the effect that ROSCAs have on the time that it takes an individual to obtain 
financing (Callier, 1991; Besley, Coate & Loury, 1994); ROSCAs role in solving intertemporal allocation problems and in 
facilitating the acquisition of durable goods (Besley & Loury, 1994, Levenson and Besley, 1998); the relative merits of different 
mechanisms for distributing ROSCA funds (Besley & Loury, 1994; Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen, 1999); the potential for risk sharing 
in ROSCAs (Besley, 1995a; Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998); and the way the ROSCA allocation compares to that produced by 
banks or informal credit markets (Besley and Loury, 1994; Van den Brink & Chavas, 1997).  Further, most of the ROSCA 
literature can also be segmented into studies that emphasize either broad conceptual matters or those that examine ROSCAs on 
an individual country level (Besley and Levenson, 1996 for Taiwan; Handa and Kirton, 1999 for Jamaica; Kimuyu, 1999 in East 
Africa; and Dekle and Hamada, 2000 for Japan).  In addition, little research explores ROSCAs’ ability to enforce its terms of 
membership, except Chiteji, 2002. 
  
Anthropologists’ primary scholarly interest and fascination with the traditions of informal financial cooperatives operating in 
many areas of the non-western world including Asia, Africa and the West Indies are established (Notteboom, (1948); Geetz 
(1962); Ardener (1964); Bouman (1979); though less work is devoted to understanding their economic performance and influence 
on savings and wealth accumulation in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States (Kurtz, 1973; Bonnett, 1976).  In 
early sociological literature, these associations are equated with voluntary associations and mutual aid societies that exist in many 
instances among Jews, African-Americans, Japanese and other immigrants in urban society in the industrialized modern worlds.   
 
Prior to the 1960s ROSCAs were referred to as ‘Rotating Credit Associations or RCA’ (Geertz, 1962, p. 242; Notteboom, 1948, 
pp.423-30), and emphasized loans and credit rather than savings (Adams and Ghate, 1992; Ardener, 1964). However, in public 
policy circles Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refer to ROSCAs as pooled savings or community savings funds (Fannie Mae, 2002 
& 2009).  Specifically, lending underwriting guidelines of Fannie Mae refer to ROSCAs as “pooled savings (community saving 
funds)” initially in guidelines released June 30, 2002 that states that “some communities establish pooled savings arrangements 
(which may be called community saving funds) to give individuals who customarily use cash for their expenses and do not keep 
their savings in depository institutions as disciplined way of accumulating fund” (Fannie Mae, X, 603.20, 2002).  These 
underwriting guidelines establishes that  “funds from a community savings account or any other type of pooled savings may be 
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used for a down payment if the borrower can provide documentation to evidence his or her regular participation in contributing 
to the savings fund … The borrower’s obligation to continue making ongoing contributions under the pooled savings arrangement 
should be considered as part of his or her total debt when calculating the debt-to-income ratio”(Fannie Mae, B3-4, 2002 & 2009). 
Fannie Mae appears to also establish in regulations consideration of ROSCA participation as a borrower using “nontraditional 
credit history or alternative credit”; which allows a lender to use written references from creditors and the borrower’s bank  
statements to document a nontraditional credit history (Fannie Mae, X, 804, 2002).  However, an update to the 2012 regulation 
related to nontraditional mortgage credit reporting regulation states that their use is unacceptable when a borrower has no credit 
history, and it cannot be used to artificially create a credit history (Fannie Mae, B3-5. 2012).  
 
This notion of a banking connection is discussed by Chiteji (2002, p.394) who views “ROSCAs as being required to solve an 
optimization problem for the entrepreneur”… and “a potential solution to this intertemporal allocation problem because it 
provides a means for entrepreneurs to put their separate funds into one pot … and to mobilize sufficient funds to allow one 
member to purchase the indivisible good at every date that the ROSCA meets as a result.” Further, suggested is that the 
monitoring cost of the formal banking sector contribute to the existence of ROSCAs; resulting in the greater a bank sector’s 
monitoring costs, the more entrepreneurs there are who are excluded and left to seek out ROSCA financing.  If the banking 
sectors monitoring costs can be reduced, one would expect ROSCA activities to decline as a result (Chiteji, 2002, p. 406).   
  
There are two studies that focus on US ROSCAs; Bonnett (1981) seminal study that analyzed Rotating Credit Associations 
(RCAs) used by West Indian immigrants and Light’s (1972) study of RCAs use by Chinese, Japanese and Black ethnic enterprise 
efforts in the U.S. most relevant to my proposed workplace-based ROSCA study.  Bonnett (1981) provides the groundwork that 
reveals the importance of RCAs in the U.S as self-help institutions that serve as “structural shields” enabling the immigrants to 
cope with the complexity of urban life (Bonnett, 1981, p. xiii) and a means of saving for a major event or purchase or small-scale 
capital formation.  This study of U.S. ROSCAs describes them as functional and instrumental institutions serving socio-economic 
functions among Black immigrant communities and their efforts to institutionalize these associations into their informal banking 
system. Light’s (1972) research provides a valuable historical analysis of RCAs existence in the U.S. and relevance as “practical 
economic traditions that are a part of functioning culture.”     
 
Pool Savings and ROSCAs Assumptions, Purpose & Basic Operating Model    
Three pooled savings assumptions are found in the literature.  The first assumption is the general belief (at least from the 
anthropological literature) that ROSCAs are informal finance mechanisms that are predominantly used by the poor.  Ardener 
(pg. 2, 1995) argues that “where incomes are very low, where there is no formal social security network, where ill health stalks 
and a variety of calamities hover, a system of low-cost ROSCAs helps to meet the challenges for all …”.  Kurtz (1973) views 
poverty as a positive “correlate” of ROSCA participation.  Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) find that evidence on participation 
by the poor is widespread.  Others find that ROSCAs are a response to deprivation and focusing on the whole context – socio-
political, cultural and economic as well as the structural features of the associations (Wu, 1974; Kurtz 1973).  Levenson and 
Besley (1996b) and Handa and Kirton (1999) challenge this assumption by offering empirical evidence that ROSCAs may not 
necessarily be meant for the poor. They show that ROSCA participation increases with income, i.e., richer individuals are more 
likely to participate in ROSCAs.  Levenson and Besley (1996b) allude to this problem of endogeneity, but do not address this 
specifically due to the lack of good instruments. Handa and Kirton (1999) treat income as exogenous to participation. 
    
The second reoccurring assumption is that people who participate in ROSCAs are credit constrained. The literature explains that 
even though ROSCAs serve both an economic and a social function; their primary purpose is economic - to pool funds from 
multiple participants in order to achieve certain financial goals; while their secondary purpose is social – with their meetings also 
providing important opportunities for feasting and networking (Hevener, 2006).   Even though ROSCAs differ by region, a basic 
model can be extracted from the apparent diversity of ethnic customs (Light, 1972, pp. 21-22) that they “assist in small scale 
capital formation” (Ardener, 1964, p.217).  Moreover, the lack of collateral is often given as a reason for why people choose an 
informal finance mechanism (such as the ROSCA) over a formal financial institution.  Some scholars explain how “a group of 
individuals without access to credit markets could improve their welfare by forming a ROSCA” (Besley, Coate & Loury, 1992, 
p. 1). However, with this upward relationship between expenditure and ROSCA participation, there could be an indication that 
ROSCAs participants may not be credit constrained.   
  
There is limited reference in the literature that outside the U.S. some participants may not be credit constrained.  While this was 
unspecified in the theoretical work of Besley, Coate and Loury (1992), Handa and Kirton’s work (1999) suggests that wealthier 
individuals may be members of ROSCAs, claiming that they “... observe individuals who are unlikely to be credit constrained in 
the formal capital market” (Handa and Kirton 1999, pg.180).  In addition, Varadharjan’s Inonesia study found that those who 
participate in ROSCAs are less likely to be credit constrained.  Several of the hypotheses that Besley, Coate & Loury (1993) 
conjectured have been tested in a series of follow-up papers. However, thus far, the assumption of credit constrained as it related 
to US ROSCAs has not been researched, even though such a review is important to understanding how workplace-based ROSCAs 
work. On the U.S. landscape, Bonnett (1981) comments that “they help some West Indian immigrants validate their middle-class 
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aspirations through initial down payments on homes and purchases of businesses.”  Hence, our understanding why individuals 
participate in U.S ROSCAs and whether it is because they are credit constrained is unclear.  Left unanswered is why they might 
participate in more than one ROSCA, and even move from one to another.  This void is the literature regarding the underlying 
fundamental assumptions of U.S. ROSCAs serve as a springboard for my research that will add to our understanding in this area. 
  
The limited literature on U.S. ROSCA supports that they are used by credit constrained and poor individuals. U.S. ROSCAs are 
referred to as “the poor man’s bank” (Bonnett, 1981, p.76), and the argument maintains that, “Black borrowers were relatively  
disadvantaged in the capital market simply by virtue of their impoverishment and the marginal status of their business (Light, 
1972, p.19).   However, this dissertation explores whether ROSCAs are used by middle and upper income immigrants and not 
just by the poor.  The third and final assumption is that women are more likely to participate in ROSCAs than men (Ardener, 
1964; Ardener & Burman, 1995).   
 
3 SUMMARY 
ROSCAs and Unbanked and Underbanked Practices in U.S.      
How are ROSCAs viewed by the banking and financial services makers is connected to terminology used to define and categorize 
their use and preferences regarding financial services.  Here in lies a major policy issue that few are looking at; financial inclusion 
vs. exclusion that is linked to definitions of banked and unbanked, that treats ROSCAs as part of the informal or alternative 
sectors, and categorizes its users as “underbanked.”  Established in the literature are the high and ever growing numbers of 
immigrants classified as “unbanked” or “underbanked” that by current definition are without any established retail banking 
relationship and dependent on check cashing centers for their needs or the U.S. Postal Services to issue affordable money orders.  
Estimated nationwide, there are seventeen million unbanked people; an increase from ten million in 2002; and forty-three million 
that are underbanked.  Use of this definition for underbanked results in an estimated 6% of Americans over the age of sixteen 
that use an alternative or informal (community-based) method of savings (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012) falling into this 
category of unbanked. 
 
They are viewed as low- and moderate-income people that are victims of “financial exclusion” by policy makers convinced that 
banking the unbanked is the solution (Servon, 2013).  According to the FDIC’s third National Survey of unbanked and 
underbanked households in the U.S. – household are categorized as “unbanked” (not having an account at an insured institution); 
“underbanked” (having a bank account but also use alternative financial services (AFS) outside of the banking system); or “fully 
banked” (having a checking or a savings account but do not meet the definition of underbanked).  According to this 2013 survey 
of U.S. households 7.7 percent (1 in 13) were “unbanked”; while 20.0 percent (24.8 million) were “underbanked” (FDIC, 2014); 
and one in four households reported obtaining either transactional products or credit from non-bank providers in the prior 12 
months. When applying the FDIC definitions to my diagram (included as Figure 1) of formal, informal and alternative financial 
sectors, only households that choose financial tools associated with the formal “Main Street” sector exclusively are considered 
“banked and financially included”.  The almost one-third of the households that are considered “unbanked, or underbanked, and 
financially are excluded” when choosing to use alternative financial services such as ROSCAs.    
  
When these households were asked to self-define their banking choices, they disagree with the FDIC’s categorization. ROSCA 
users consider themselves financially included and fully-banked.  Figure 1 below illustrates the difficulties of banking and 
financial services policy makers to categorize the formal, informal and alternative financial sectors into three separate and distinct 
banking patterns classification -“fully banked, underbanked, or unbanked.”   
                             
                           Figure 1 
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This research suggests an increased focus on overlap between the three financial services sectors in order to better understand 
the utilization of workplace-based ROSCAs operating within the informal sector as effective methods of savings, asset-building, 
and as alternative financial services.   
 
This research revealed a hidden, yet important overlap and intersections between the three sectors leading to expanded 
understanding of the role of ROSCAs and the hidden informal sector and stimulates ongoing conversation around financial 
inclusion and exclusion.  At the center of these conversations is the preference in the U.S. for income or asset-based policy 
responses linked to an established underlying pathology of poverty and poor people. 
 
Five themes emerged related to workplace ROSCA users, uses, benefits, differences, and participants. Seven findings derived 
from the themes. First, workplace ROSCAs are more widely used and established than indicated in the literature. Second, 
immigrants brought both workplace and traditional ROSCAs to the United States after their successful use in their country of 
origin. Third, workplace ROSCA users are diverse and have established credit. This finding contradicts the three established 
assumptions in the literature (that the poor, women, and the credit constrained are the predominant ROSCA users). Fourth, 
workplace and traditional ROSCAs are used for similar purposes, predominately asset building. Fifth, workplace ROSCA users 
want their short-term savings to be out of reach and shielded from both temptations and kinship networks. Sixth, participants 
perceived workplace ROSCAs as tools for financial security that are slightly less risky and dependent on trust than traditional 
ROSCAs. Seventh, workplace ROSCA users view themselves as fully banked, while policy makers classify them as 
underbanked.  
 
This research provides insight into existence of workplace ROSCAs; their expanding use to save and build assets by more than 
just immigrants and the working poor; and the existence of an alternative reality with ROSCA users as “fully-banked”  while 
using alternative and informal financial tools that leads to policymakers revisiting the existing consumer banking classifications.  
This research recommends policy recognition of this established alternative savings and asset-building tool that may exist in 
response to a market failure to provide a vehicle designed to deal with money in the way that growing numbers of people desire 
– out of easy reach and away from increasing fees. 
 
7 REFERENCES  
Ardener, Shirley. (1964) The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society 
of Great Britain and Ireland, pages 201-229. 
 
Ardener, Shirley & Sandra Burman. (1995). Money-Go-Rounds:  The Importance of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
for Women. Oxford/ Washington D.C.:  Berg. 
 
Besley, Timothy. (1995). Nonmarket institutions for credit and risk sharing in low-income countries. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9(1):  115-127. 
 
Besley, Timothy, Stephen Coate, and Glenn Loury. (1990). The Economics of Rotating  Savings and Credit Associations. 
MIT-CEPR 90-014WP May 1990.  http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/50147/28596085.pdf 
 
Besley, T., Coate,T., & Loury, G. (1993). The economics of rotating savings and credit  associations. American Economic 
Review, 83 (4), 792–810. 
 
Besley, Timothy, Stephen Coate,and Glenn Loury.  (1994). The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations and 
efficiency.http://sws1.bu.edu/gloury/papers/Besley,%20Coate%20and%20Loury%20(RES)%201994.pdf 
 
Besley, Timothy & Levenson A. (1996). The role of informal finance in household capital accumulation: evidence from Taiwan. 
The Economic Journal 106: 39-59. 
 
Bonnett, Aubrey W. (1976). Rotating Credit Associations among Black West Indian Immigrants in Brooklyn:  A Study. New 
York, City University. 
 
Bonnett, Aubrey W. (1981) Structured Adaption of Black Migrants from the Caribbean: An Examination of an Indigenous 
Banking System in Brooklyn.  Phylon, Vol. 42, No. 4, pages 346-355.  http://preview.jstor.org/stable/275013. 
Callier P.  (1991)  Informal finance:  the rotating saving and credit association – an interpretation.  Kyklos 43:  273-276. 
 
Calomiris, C.W., & Rajaraman, I. (1998).  The role of Roscas: lumpy indivisibles or event insurance.  Journal of Development 
Economics, 56(1), 07-216.  doi:10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00059-5. 
 Northeast Business & Economics Association Proceedings 2018  356 
  
  
Chiteji, Ngina S. (2002). Promised Kept:  Enforcement and the Role of Rotating Savings  and Credit Associations in an 
Economy. Journal of International Development 14, 393-411.  
 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Leora Klapper (2012) Measuring Financial Inclusion:  The Global Findex Database.  World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 6025.  http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/country/united-states 
 
Fannie Mae Single Family 2006 Selling Guide/ Part X:  Underwriting Guidelines/ X,  Chapter 6:  Assets and Funds for 
Closing (07/03/00)/ X, 603:  Source of Borrower’s Funds (01/31/06)/ X, 603.20: Pooled Savings (Community Savings Funds) 
06/30/02. 
 
Fannie Mae Single Family 2006 Selling Guide/ Part X:  Underwriting Guidelines/ X, Chapter 8:  Credit History (06/30/2002) / 
X, 804:  Using Nontraditional Credit History to Assess Credit Risk, 06/30/2002. 
 
Fannie Mae Single Family 2013 Selling Guide/ Part B:  Origination Through Closing/ Subpart B3, Underwriting Borrowers/ 
Chapter B3-4, Assets Assessment/ Section B3-4.2, Verification of Depository Assets / B3-4.2-04, Pooled Savings (Community 
Savings Funds) 04.01.2009. 
 
Fannie Mae Single Family 2013 Selling Guide/ Part B:  Origination Through Closing/ Subpart B3, Underwriting Borrowers/ 
Chapter B3-5, Credit Assessment / Section B3-5.4, Nontraditional Credit History / B3-5.4-01, Nontraditional Mortgage Credit 
Reports. 08/21/2012. 
 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (2014). 2013 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households. 
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013report.pdf 
 
Geertz, Clifford.  (1962). The Rotating Credit Association:  A “Middle Rung” in Development.  Economic Development and 
Cultural Change.10 (3) (April 1962), 241-263. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1151976 
 
Handa, S., & Kirton, C. (1999).The economics of rotating savings and credit associations: evidence from the Jamaican ‘Partner '. 
Journal of Development Economics, 60 (1), 173-194. doi: 10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00040-1. 
 
Hevener, Christy Chung. (2006).“Alternative Financial Vehicles:  Rotating Savings and  Credit  Associations (ROSCAS)”. 
Discussion Paper-Community Affairs Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/discussion-papers/discussionpaper-ROSCAs.pdf 
 
Kimuyu, P. K. (1999). Rotating saving and credit associations in rural east Africa. World Development, 27(7), 1299-1308. 
doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00049-2 
 
Kurtz, D. (1973). The rotating credit association: an adaptation to poverty. Human Organization, 32(1), 49–58. 
 
Levenson A, Besley T. (1996). The anatomy of an informal financial market: Rosca participation in Taiwan. Journal of 
Development Economics 51(1): 45–68. 
 
Light, Ivan H. (1972). Ethnic Enterprise in America:  Business and Welfare Among Chinese, Japanese, and Blacks. Berkeley, 
CA:  University of California Press. 
 
Notteboom (1948). Assistance Economique Mutuelle Systematiseedans L’Asie du Sudet  de L’est, in OrientaliaNederlandica 
editor Leiden. 423-30. 
 
OIG, USPS. (2014). Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for the Underserved. White  Paper, Arlington, VA:  USPS OIG. 
 
Servon, Lisa J. (2013). The Real Reason the Poor Go Without Bank Accounts. Atlantic Cities Place Matters. 
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and- economy/2013/09/why-poor-choose-go-without-bank-accounts/6783/ 
 
Servon, Lisa J. (2013). The High Cost, for the Poor, of Using a Bank. The New Yorker. October 10.2013. 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-high-cost- for-the-poor-of-using-a-bank 
 
Van den Brink R, Chavas JP. (1997). The microeconomics of an indigenous African institution: the rotating savings and credit 
association. Economic Development and Cultural Change 45(4): 744–777. 
